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Reexamination of the non-linear relationship between management ownership and 
earnings management: Evidence from Japan 
 
Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to provide further evidence on the functional form of relationship 
between management ownership and earnings management in the Japanese context.   Applying 
regression model with third order polynomial like Teshima and Shuto (2008), this study finds 
evidence of non-monotonic (cubic) relationship between management ownership and earnings 
management which supports alignment-entrenchment-alignment hypothesis. However, this study 
attempts to confirm the robustness of such findings with two additional approaches, namely, 
piece-wise linear regression and third order polynomial regression with mean centering 
adjustment. Unlike initial results, further evidence indicate that though the relationship between 
management ownership and earnings management is non-linear but the nature is quadratic (‘U’- 
shaped) which supports alignment-entrenchment hypothesis. Such conflicting findings will surely 
assist the future researchers to be cautious in designing non-linear models while investigating 
the relationship between ownership structure and earnings management. 
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Berle and Means (1932) document that when shareholders are dispersed, managers will try to 
maximize their own interests at the costs of shareholders’ value maximization goal. Following 
Berle and Means (1932), Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that such attempts decline as 
management ownership rises. This argument is often denoted as ‘Incentive alignment hypothesis’ 
which states that greater managerial stake in the ownership of the company aligns the interest of 
the managers with that of shareholders, and thus reduce the level of opportunistic behavior of 
managers (e.g., Velury and Jenkins, 2006; Warfield et al., 1995).  On the contrary, another 
stream of research (e.g., Cohen et al., 2008; Darrough et al., 1998) argues that greater managerial 
ownership provides greater discretion in the hands of the managers which may induce them to 
involve with more opportunistic activities that favor their welfare. This argument is frequently 
denoted as ‘Managerial entrenchment hypothesis’ However, the empirical literature includes no 
consensus on the exact direction of the relationship between managerial ownership and their 
opportunistic behavior. The most recent studies relax the assumption of a strictly linear 
relationship and examine the non-linear relationship between managerial share ownership and 
opportunistic behaviors. They argue that the relationship between managerial ownership and 
opportunistic behavior of management is non-monotonic where both the alignment as well as 
entrenchment effects operate at different level of managerial shareholdings (e.g., Bos et al., 
2013; Khan and Mather, 2013;  Sánchez-Ballesta and García-Meca 2007; Yang et al., 2008; Yeo 
et al., 2002). For low levels of managerial ownership, external discipline and internal controls or 
incentives will dominate managerial behavior and thus, align their interests with that of other 
shareholders. When managerial ownership rises to a certain threshold (i.e. once managers gain 
controlling authority or voting rights), managerial labor market and external market for corporate 
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control become ineffective and there will be a resurgence of managerial entrenchment behavior 
(Yeo et al., 2002).  Therefore, the relationship between managerial ownership and mangerial 
opportunistic behaviors is non-monotonic like ‘U’ shape (i.e., alignment-entrenchment 
hypothesis).  As further extension to this stream of research, Davies et al. (2005) argue that 
managerial incentives again akin to other shareholders at very high level of such ownership, 
because their financial wellbeing is highly affected by the wellbeing of other shareholders and 
the company as well. Like Davies et al. (2005), Teshima and Shuto (2008) have constructed a 
theoretical model demonstrating the incentive alignment effect for both high and low levels of 
managerial ownership and the management entrenchment intermediate levels of managerial 
ownership (i.e., alignment-entrenchment-alignment hypothesis).   According to Tehshima and 
Shuto (2008): 
 Two types of motivation for managers relating to managerial shareholdings: the first is 
that managers will work to enhance the value of shares in a firm if they hold shares; the 
second is that managers, expecting to be reappointed, will make an effort to inspire the 
confidence of shareholders. The former motivation is expected to increase with 
managerial shareholdings, but is nonexistent when managers have no or very marginal 
shareholding. On the other hand, the latter motivation is not effective when managers 
have a sufficiently large number of shares and, therefore, do not need to worry about 
dismissal. (p. 109) 
 
They suggest that a non-monotonic relationship exists when managers’ private benefit derived 
from their position is large and/or the sensitivity of the probability of managerial dismissal linked 
to corporate performance is high. Using a sample of Japanese listed firms for the period 1991-
2000, they provide empirical evidence of a significant non-monotonic (cubic) relationship 
between managerial ownership and opportunistic managerial behaviors. As a proxy of 
opportunistic behaviors of management, they use the amount of earnings discretionarily adjusted 
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by managers, which is commonly termed as ‘earnings management’. Their empirical evidences 
find that as managerial ownership increases, earnings management decreases for both high and 
low levels of managerial ownership, while it increases for intermediate levels of managerial 
ownership.  
Based on the work of Teshima and Shuto (2008), this study attempts to reexamine this issue 
more robustly with alternative empirical models using very recent data in the Japanese context. 
Along with using the third-order polynomial model suggested by Tehsima and Shuto (2008), this 
study adopts two additional approaches, namely, piece-wise linear regression and third-order 
polynomial regression with mean-centering adjustment to check the non-linear relationship 
between managerial ownership and earnings management. Chen et al. (1993) argue that findings 
reported in the prior literature may be sensitive to alternative model specifications. Failure to test 
sensitivity of results to other model specifications contributes to the contradictory results in the 
literature (Scherer, 1988). In addition, as the work of Tehshima and Shuto (2008) is based on 
data during the period 1990s, when Japanese economy went through severe financial turmoil, it 
would be atleast worthwhile to reinvestigate the empirical validity of their proposed theoretical 
model in the post-crisis period.  Darrough et al. (1998) argue that the stock market crash of the 
1990s had an effect on the earnings management behavior or incentives of Japanese firms and its 
relationship with managerial ownership.  
This study reveals very interesting findings. When third-order polynomial model like Teshima 
and Shuto (2008) is applied, this study finds evidence of non-monotonic (cubic) relationship 
between management ownership and earnings management, based on 11,360 firm-year 
observations during the period 2001-2011. Consistent with alignment-entrenchment-alignment 
hypothesis, earnings management decreases first, then increases, and finally decreases as 
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ownership by managers rises. However, such findings can’t be confirmed with two alternative 
approaches. The further evidence shows that the relationship between managerial ownership and 
earnings management is non-linear (quadratic) with ‘U’ pattern (i.e., earnings management 
decreases first, and then increases as managerial ownership increases) which supports alignment-
entrenchment hypothesis rather than alignment-entrenchment-alignment hypothesis. Such 
findings cast a serious doubt on the empirical validity of the theoretical model developed by 
Tehshima and Shuto (2008) in the Japanese context. Moreover, the findings of this study will 
surely make the future researchers careful in drawing conclusion about the relationship between 
ownership structure and earnings management. Particularly, this study demonstrates the 
importance of applying multiple non-linear model specifications to test this phenomenon rather 
than relying on one approach. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents review of prior studies, 
and hypotheses to be empirically tested in this study. Section 3 describes research design and 
sample characteristics. Section 4 presents empirical results, and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
The typical characteristics of publicly traded companies is the separation of ownership from 
control, which gives rise to agency conflicts between managers and shareholders ( Berle and 
Means, 1932; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Managers of diffusely owned firms have incentives to report earnings that deviates from the 
substance of underlying economic transactions to maximize private benefits at the cost of 
shareholders or creditors (Christie and Zimmerman, 1994; Dechow and Skinner, 2000; Healy 
and Wahlen, 1999; Leuz et al., 2003; Warfield et al.,1995). Accrual based earnings management 
6 
 
is one process through which managers can present reported earnings in a manner that deviates 
from the underlying real and economic transactions of a firm (Bos et al., 2013; Scott, 2012). 
Mitra and Rodrigue (2002) argue that, as earnings management technique, accruals earnings 
management is the most damaging to the usefulness of accounting reports because outside 
investors are unaware of the extent of such accruals. In empirical research, accrual earnings 
management is widely used as a proxy of opportunistic behaviors of managers to maximize their 
interests at the costs of shareholders. (e.g., Dechow et al., 1995; Jones, 1991; Kazsnik, 1999; 
Kothari et al., 2005).   
Despite the importance of potential implications, there exists no theoretical or empirical 
consensus on whether managerial ownership reduces or aggravates earnings management 
behaviors. There are two competing hypotheses of the effect of managerial ownership on 
earnings management. The first one is called incentive-alignment hypothesis. This hypothesis 
argues that self-serving and opportunistic managerial behavior is most likely to manifest when 
managers own little or no equity in the firm. Managers with marginal or no equity stake have the 
tendency to manage earnings to increase their performance related bonus or compensation, relax 
contractual constrains of debt covenants, seek protection against dismissal when 
underperforming, and to window dress the financial statement prior to the offering of securities 
to the public (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Healy, 1985; Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Shuto, 2007; 
Yang et al., 2008). However, as capital bonding increases, the incentive of managers to act in the 
interest of shareholders also increases. This incentive-alignment leads managers to adopt 
accounting policies and estimation techniques that reflect the underlying economic transactions 
of the firm. Consistent with this framework, Warfield et al. (1995) first find a negative 
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relationship between managerial share ownership and magnitude of abnormal accruals for US 
firms. Velury and Jenkins (2006) also find similar results in the US context. 
A competing view is the managerial entrenchment effect, which is based on the argument that 
greater managerial ownership increases the discretionary power of the manager which is 
ultimately used to expropriate wealth from other shareholders. When managers own relatively 
large shares in the company, their control over the operation as well as governance of the firms 
substantially increase, which induces them to involve with more aggressive earnings 
management to maximize their own utility (for example, excessive bonus, influencing share 
price, getting external fund, meeting debt covenants). Moreover, greater managerial ownership 
limits accounting information flows to outside investors, and creates information asymmetry. 
Information asymmetry allows managers to manipulate earnings in order to maximize their own 
interests, thus lowering the transparency and informativesness of reported earnings. Cheng and 
Warfield (2005) focus on the relation between equity incentives and signed abnormal accruals, 
and find that managers with high equity incentive are more likely to involve with earnings 
management. Cohen et al. (2008) also find that discretionary accruals are positively related to 
managerial equity incentives in the pre- and post Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 periods for US firms. 
Interestingly, in contrast to the results of Warfield et al. (1995) and others (Cheng and Warfield 
2005; Cohen et al., 2008), Francis et al.(1999) and Rajgopal et al. (1999) find no evidence that 
managerial share ownership has a significant impact on income-increasing or decreasing accruals 
of US firms. Gabrielsen et al. (2002) report no relationship between managerial ownership and 
absolute abnormal accruals for Danish firms. Other studies such as by Othman and Zeghal 
(2006) for Canada and France, and Young (1999) for UK also examine linear relations and report 
mixed results. In Japanese context, Darrough et al. (1998) investigate the monotonic relationship 
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between managerial ownership and discretionary accruals, and find a significant positive 
relationship in 1989 but no significant relationship in subsequent three years.  
 
A series of studies (Bos et al. 2013; Khan and Mather, 2013; Yeo et al., 2002; Sánchez-Ballesta 
and García-Meca 2007) relax the assumption of a strictly linear relationship and examine 
nonlinear (quadratic) relations between managerial share ownership and abnormal accruals. 1 
These studies build on the idea that greater equity ownership can be equally beneficial or 
detrimental to shareholders. It can prompt managers to act in the best interest of shareholders, 
but also induce them to exercise control over the firm at the expense of shareholder wealth when 
market discipline or managerial labor markets are weak or the board is entrenched (Bos et al., 
2013). As management ownership continues to increase beyond the low range, mangers tend to 
gain stronger control over the firm, and external monitoring becomes less effective. Although the 
alignment effect may still be operative, but the management entrenchment will nevertheless exert 
a relative greater impact. Consistent with this view, Yeo et al. (2002) and Sánchez-Ballesta and 
García-Meca (2007) find a U-shaped relationship between management ownership and 
discretionary accruals for firms listed in Singapore and Spain, respectively. Their results show 
that discretionary accruals fall with greater managerial ownership and find turning points at 25 
percent and between 37-48 percent, respectively, after which, earnings manipulation increases. 
Based on a study of Australian listed companies, Khan and Mather (2013) also find a negative 
relationship between value of managerial share ownership and discretionary accruals at lower 
levels of ownership value but a positive relationship when ownership value exceed a certain level. 
As an extension of non-linear investigation in the empirical analysis of ownership-performance 
link, Morck et al. (1988) and Short and Keasey(1999) persuasively posit that the entrenchment 
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effect would be dominant for intermediate level of managerial ownership, while the alignment 
effect would be dominant for low and high levels of ownership. They also find evidence in 
support of their expected non-monotonic relationship between managerial ownership and 
corporate performance or value. While investigating the relationship between managerial 
ownership and earnings management in the Japanese context, Teshima and Shuto (2008) propose 
a theoretical model demonstrating the incentive alignment effect for both high and low levels of 
managerial ownership and the management entrenchment intermediate level of managerial 
ownership. They find that the relationship is negative until managers own 13.6 percent of share 
capital. The relation turns positive for regions of 13.6 percent to 38.8 percent and negative again 
when managerial share ownership exceeds 38.8 percent of equity share capital.  
This study is designed to reexamine the same issue more robustly with alternative empirical 
models using very recent data in the Japanese context. Chen et al. (1993) argue that findings 
reported in the prior literature may be sensitive to alternative model specifications. Failure to test 
sensitivity of results to other model specifications contributes to the contradictory results in the 
literature (Scherer, 1988). In addition, as the work of Tehshima and Shuto (2008) is based on 
data during the period 1990s, when Japanese economy went through severe financial turmoil, it 
would be worthwhile to reinvestigate the empirical validity of their proposed theoretical model 
in the post-crisis period.  Darrough et al. (1998) argue that the stock market crash of the 1990s 
had an effect on the earnings management behavior or incentives of Japanese firms and its 
relationship with managerial ownership. Therefore, like Tehsima and Shuto (2008), the 
following hypothesis has been deigned to investigate in this study: 
H1: The forces of alignment and entrenchment that affect managerial behavior lead to a non-
linear relationship between share ownership by managers and earnings management. 
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The above hypothesis can be fragmented into following three hypotheses: 
H1a: For low level of managerial ownership, increasing share-ownership to managers decrease 
the opportunistic behavior of managers (earnings management). [Incentive alignment 
hypothesis] 
H1b: For intermediate level of managerial ownership, increasing share-ownership to managers 
increase the opportunistic behavior of managers (earnings management). [Managerial 
entrenchment hypothesis] 
H1c: For high level of managerial ownership, increasing share-ownership to managers 
decreases the opportunistic behavior of managers (earnings management). [Incentive alignment 
hypothesis] 
                                        <<<<<FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE>>>>>>>>>> 
3. Research design 
3.1 Measure of earnings management 
Following Kasznik (1999), this study estimates nondiscretionary accruals as a function of (a) 
change in revenue adjusted for change in receivables, (b) the level of property, plant, and 
equipment, and (c) change in cash flow from operations. Kasznik (1999) extend the modified 
Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) by for including the change in cash flow from operations in it.  
As reason Kasznik (1999) points to Dechow’s (1994) finding that change in cash flow from 
operations is negatively correlated with total accruals. Like Teshima and Shuto (2008), this study 
uses a cross-sectional model to control the effect of change in industry-wide economic 
conditions on total accruals and to allow the coefficient to vary across years. In estimating the 
cross-sectional accruals model, each firm-year is grouped into an estimation portfolio that 
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consists of observations with the same Toyo Stock Exchange (TSE) new industry classification 
code and fiscal year. The cross-sectional model  is specified as follows: 
 
TAC , = α + β , (∆REV , -∆REC , ) + β , PPE , +β , ∆CFO , +ε ,  
where, 
TAC= total accruals, [(△current assets-△cash and cash equivalents)- (△current liabilities-
△financing items) - △other allowances-depreciation] 
△financing items = changes in short-term debt+ changes in commercial paper+ changes in 
current portion of bonds and convertible bonds, 
△other allowances=changes in allowances classified within fixed assets, 
△REV= change in sales revenue, 
PPE= gross property, plant, and equipment, 
△CFO=change in cash flow from operations,[ △(NI-TAC)] 
NI=income before extra-ordinary items. 
The subscript j denotes each firm in the estimation portfolio p. All variables are deflated by 
average total assets. 
Using the above model, discretionary accruals (DAC) are estimated as the difference (residual) 
between the actual value and the predicted value of total accruals (TAC). Nondiscretionary 
accruals depend on the level of activity of the firm, whereas discretionary accruals (DAC) reflect 
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the subjective or discretionary judgment of the managers about the firm performance. Managers 
often exercise discretion over accounting methods, estimation and recognition criteria to 
opportunistically manage these discretionary accruals to serve their purpose. The absolute value 
discretionary accruals (|DAC|) is used as the proxy for opportunistic earnings management 
behavior. 
3.2 Model design and variables 
Following Teshima and Shuto (2008), this study estimates the following regression with third 
order polynomial to estimate the relationship between managerial ownership and earnings 
management: 
|DAC|  = α + ∑ β DIR   + ∑ δ Control variables + Industry effect+ Year 
effect+ε  
The variable ‘DIR’ which denotes fraction of shares owned by top-managers, who are also the 
directors of the companies, and its’ higher order terms ( DIR , DIR ) are the main research 
variables in this study.  As mention in Teshima and Shuto (2008), in most of the Japanese firms, 
directors perform the role that their counterparts in the United States would perform as executive 
managers. The subscript i denotes each firm in the each fiscal year t.  
Along with managerial ownership variable(s), this study considers several control variables 
which may affect the relationship between managerial ownership and earnings management. 
First, this study includes fractions of shareholdings by financial institutions (denoted hereafter as 
‘FIN’) and other corporations (denoted as ‘CORP’) as control variables in the regression model. 
Large institutional shareholders reduce the scope for managers to diverse greatly from the 
interest of shareholders (Davies et al 2005; Mitra and Cready, 2005) and inhibit managers from 
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increasing or decreasing reported profits towards the managers’ desired level or range of profits 
(Chung et al., 2002; Rajgopal et al. 1999; Velury and Jenkins, 2006). Consistent with efficient 
monitoring hypothesis, this study expects that the shareholdings of financial institutions (FIN) 
and other corporations (CORP) would have a negative relationship with earnings management. 
This study also controls for several other factors that have considered to be related with earnings 
management by Teshima and Shuto (2008). These include top-executives’ compensation 
(COMP), firm size (SIZE) and leverage (DER). ‘SIZE’ is defined as the natural logarithms of 
total sales, ‘DER’ is defined as total debt divided by total assets, ‘COMP’ is defined as total cash 
compensation paid to managers (directors) divided by total assets. In addition, industry dummies 
and year dummies are included in regression model to control for the industry-specific and time-
specific macro-economic conditions that might have some influence on empirical findings. 
3.3 Sample 
The sample of Japanese firms is selected from the period 2001 to 2011 based on the following 
criteria: 
(i) Firms are listed on first and second sections of TSE. 
(ii) Financial companies including banks, securities firms, and insurance firms are 
excluded. 
(iii) The accounting period of the firms is unchanged during the period 2001 to 2011. 
(iv) The financial statement data of the firms necessary for the study are available in 
Nikkei-NEEDS database. 




The selection process yields 11,360 firm-year observations for Japanese non-financial firms 
publicly traded on the first section and second section of the TSE. Table 1 details the breakdown 
of observations across different industry-sectors. 
 
                                   <<<<<<TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE>>>>>>>>>> 
4. Empirical findings 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of sample firms. The average of absolute value of 
discretionary accruals (|DAC|) is around 3 percent across entire sample which is very similar to 
that of Tehshima and Shuto (2008)  in the Japanese context . The average of shares owned by 
managers (DIR) is about 4 percent, which is close to the value suggested by Basu et al. (2007), 
Sakawa and Watanabel (2008), and Tehshima and Shuto (2008) taking evidence in the 1990s 
Japanese listed companies. Ownership by financial institutions (FIN) is about 26 percent and 
ownership by other business corporations (CORP) is about 27 percent, indicating the strong 
control of institutional shareholders on Japanese companies.  
Regarding firm characteristic variables, the average of firm size (SIZE) measured by total sales 
is 208,471 million yen. The average of leverage (DER) is about 58 percent, which is almost an 
identical value to that reported by Basu et al. (2007), Sakawa and Watanabel (2008), and 
Tehshima and Shuto (2008) taking evidence in the 1990s Japanese listed companies. This 
implies that the Japanese firms are still largely dependent on debt financing. The average level of 
managerial cash compensation (COMP) is around .03 percent of total assets.  
                                           <<<<<<TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE>>>>>>>>>> 
                                            <<<<<<TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE>>>>>>>>>> 
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Table 3 demonstrates the Pearson correlation matrix of variables of interests. Managerial 
ownership (DIR) is positively correlated with |DAC|. The positive relation between managerial 
ownership and |DAC| suggests the existence of entrenchment effects with increasing ownership. 
However, a simple correlation between managerial ownership and |DAC| may be masking a 
more complex functional form for this relationship, a possibility that we examine in later 
multivariate tests.  In addition, managerial ownership is negatively correlated with institutional 
ownership (both financial and business corporations). This implies that when the external 
monitoring is strong, managers will hold relatively less shares. Moreover, managerial ownership 
is negatively correlated with firm’s size and leverage, but positively correlated with the level of 
managerial cash compensation. None of the correlation coefficients between variables is too high 
to consider multicollinearity problem in this stage. 
4.2 Regression results 
The estimated results using two-ways fixed effect regression (industry effect and year effect) are 
shown in table 4.  This study tests the linear, quadratic, and cubic relationship between 
managerial ownership and absolute value of discretionary accruals in model 1, model 2, and 
model 3, respectively. In model 1, the results show that the coefficient of DIR  is statistically 
insignificant, which implies that there is no linear relationship between managerial ownership 
and absolute value of discretionary accruals. In order to check the non-linear relationship, further 
attempt is made to run model 2 (quadratic non-linear model) and model 3 (cubic non-linear 
model).  In model 2, the coefficients of DIR and DIR  are statistically significant with expected 
signs: the coefficient of DIR is negative (p<.01), that of  DIR  is positive (p<.01). These finding 
confirm that the relationship between managerial ownership and absolute value of discretionary 
accruals is non-linear. The calculated turning points for the nonlinear relationship are 17 percent 
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(a minima point). It implies the absolute value of discretionary accruals is negatively related to 
managerial ownership in the 0-17 percent range (low level), positively related when managerial 
ownership exceeds 17 percent (‘U’ shape).  In model 3, like Teshima and Shuto (2008), this 
study further finds the evidence of cubic non-linear relationship where the coefficients 
of DIR, DIR , and DIR  are all statistically significant with expected signs: the coefficient of DIR 
is negative (p<.01), that of  DIR  is positive (p<.01), and that of  DIR  is negative (p<.05). The 
calculated turning points for the nonlinear relationship are 11.6 percent (a minima point) and 
37.20 percent (a maxima point). 2  It implies the absolute value of discretionary accruals is 
negatively related to managerial ownership in the 0-11.6 percent range (low level), positively 
related in the 11.6-37.20 percent ownership range (intermediate level), and negatively related 
when managerial ownership exceeds 37.20 percent (high level). 3   Like Teshima and Shuto 
(2008), the results suggests that as managerial ownership increases, earnings management 
decreases for both high and low levels of managerial ownership, while it increases for 
intermediate levels of managerial ownership. 
<<<<<< TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE>>>>>>>>>> 
However, there are two potential concerns about higher order polynomial model formulation, 
and thus, about findings so far. First, there might be a problem of high multi-collinearity between 
the lower order and higher order polynomial terms. Hill et al. (2012, p. 191) mention that it is 
sometimes true that having a variable and its square or cube in the same model causes 
collinearity problems. Asteriou and  Hall (2007, p. 163) mention that polynomials of order 
higher than two should be avoided for two reasons. First, because of reduction of the degrees of 
freedom, and second, because there is a possibility of high correlation between the polynomial 
terms (often denoted as ‘structural multicollinearity’). As a consequence of collinerity, the 
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estimated coefficients become unreliable and standard errors become very large. Moreover, the 
sample bias can become so large that the estimated coefficients get the incorrect sign (Vogelvang, 
2005). In table 5(A), this study has reported the VIF values of three models (model 1, model 2, 
and model 3). It clearly shows that the VIF values of managerial ownership variables 
(DIR, DIR , and DIR ) in model 3 are very large. According to Hair et al. (1998), VIF values 
greater than 10 indicate a multicollinearity problem. 
                                   <<<<<<TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE>>>>>>>>>> 
Second, the common non-normality of the ownership data and the statistical analysis adopted are 
areas that might require more careful attention. Prior studies argue that when the distribution of 
managerial ownership is skewed positively, the few observations with large-most managerial 
ownership might drive the results towards them in the polynomial model formulation.4 In table 6, 
this study finds that the number of observations in the range 0-11.6 percent is 10,020 (88.2 
percent), the number of observations in the range 11.6-37.2 percent is 1,243 (10.94 percent), and 
the number of observations above 37.2 percent is 97 (0.86 percent). This clearly indicates that 
the distribution of managerial ownership in Japanese context is very positively skewed.  
Therefore, it is very essential to reexamine the findings in table 4 with additional/alternative 
methods available in prior studies that can reduce or remove the aforementioned two problems 
and contribute toward the robustness of observed findings.  
                          <<<<<<TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE>>>>>>>>>> 
4.3 Additional analysis  
As a first attempt, this study did not change basic structure of the regression model but make an 
adjustment in data, which is commonly known as mean-centering approach. The common 
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problem of multi-collinearity in polynomial regression can be solved or addressed by mean-
centering approach (Mitchell, 2012, p. 58; Ruppert, 2011, p. 334; Wongrin et al., 2013, p. 330).  
Bradley and Srivastava (1979) and Dalal and Zickar (2012) argue that mean-centering atleast 
reduces nonessential collinearity. They also argue that mean-centering increase the 
interpretability of the results. Therefore, this study has adjusted the fraction of managerial 
ownership of each firm by deducting the industry-wise cross-sectional mean value of managerial 
ownership, and estimate the following regression: 
|DAC|  = α + ∑ β DIRC   + ∑ δ Control variables + Industry effect+ Year 
effect+ε  
where, 
 DIRC = fraction of shares owned by directors adjusted for industry mean, [DIRC =DIR - DIR] 
DIR= industry wise cross-sectional mean fraction of shares owned by directors. 
The results are presented in table 7.  The results show that the model 2 is better than model 1 in 
terms of individual variable significance. In model 3, when the cubic term of managerial 
ownership is added, the result shows that it is insignificant. Considering all these, model 2 is 
found to be the statistically appropriate model to estimate the relationship between managerial 
ownership and earnings management. The absolute value of discretionary accruals is negatively 
related to managerial ownership in the 0-11.6 percent range (low level), positively related above 
11.7 percent ownership range (high level). Unlike findings in table 4, these findings indicate that 
the non-monotonic relationship is quadratic or ‘U’ shape. These findings sharply contradict with 
the initial findings and the findings of Teshima and Shuto (2008).   In table 5(B) shows that the 
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VIF values of model 1, model 2, and model 3 after mean-centering adjustment are very close to 
the tolerable limits, and thus, minimize the problem of structural multi-collinerity.   
                                <<<<<<TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE>>>>>>>>>> 
As a further attempt, this study has applied another type of empirical model as suggested by 
Morck et al. (1988) to examine the non-monotonic relationship between managerial ownership 
and earnings management, commonly known as piece-wise linear regression. Morck et al. (1988) 
and Borsch-Supan and Koke (2002) argue that an econometric better approach is to re-estimate 
turning points of non-linear equation models with piece-wise linear equations.5 However, as 
existing literature fails to provide exactly defined ranges of managerial ownership to examine 
non-linearity with earnings management, this study adopts the ranges which are derived in table 
4 (0-11.6 percent, 11.6- 37.2 percent, and 37.2 percent above) and test the calculated regions 
with the following piece-wise linear regression:6  
|DAC|  = α + β DIR( _ ) + β  DIR( _ )  + β DIR( _ )  +  
∑ δ Control variables + Industry effect+ Year effect+ε  
where, 0_p1=managerial ownership is less than 11.6%, p1_p2= managerial ownership is 
greater than or equal to 11.6% but less than 37.2%, p2_above= managerial ownership is 
greater than or equal to 37.2%. Other variables are same as defined before. 
<<<<<<TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE>>>>>>>>>> 
 Table 8 depicts the findings. It shows that the relationship between the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals is negatively related to managerial ownership in the 0-11.6 percent range 
(low level), positively related in the 11.6-37.20 percent ownership range (intermediate level). But 
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there is no significant relationship when managerial ownership exceeds 37.20 percent (high 
level). These findings again confirm that even though earnings management is a non-linear 
function of managerial ownership but such relationship is quadratic (‘U’ shape), not cubic as we 
see in table 4. VIF values in table 5(C) show that there is no concern of multi-collinearity among 
the variables with piece-wise model formulation. Moreover, this method is not as sensitive as to 
the presence of outliers, enhancing more robust conclusion for the whole range of managerial 
ownership. 
Based on findings in this section, it seems more convincing that managerial ownership has non-
monotonic ‘U’-shaped impact on earnings management as measured by absolute value of 
discretionary accruals. Consistent with alignment-entrancement hypothesis, it deceases first 
(alignment hypothesis) and then increases as managerial ownership increases (entrenchment 
hypothesis) beyond approx. 11 percent. Such findings contradict with the findings of Teshima 
and Shuto (2008), who argue that it deceases first (alignment hypothesis), then increases 
(entrenchment hypothesis), and finally decreases again (alignment hypothesis).    This surely 
casts doubt on the empirical validity of the theoretical model conjectured by Teshima and Shuto 
(2008) in their paper. 
 
Regarding control variables, like Darrough et al. (1998) as well as Teshima and Shuto (2008), 
this study does not find consistent evidence that leverage (DER), managerial compensation 
(COMP) and ownership by other business corporation (CORP) have significant relationship with 
earnings management. However, consistent with efficient monitoring hypothesis, this study finds 
that ownership by financial institutions (FIN) has significant negative relationship with earnings 
management proxy.  It means that financial institutional ownership contravene earnings 
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management behaviors in the Japanese listed companies.  In addition, the results show that firm 
size (SIZE) has negative significant relationship with earnings management proxy. It implies that 
larger firms in Japanese context are subject to greater monitoring and control by the state, and 
thus, lower susceptible to earnings management tendency.   
5. Conclusion 
This paper reexamines the non-monotonic relationship between managerial ownership and 
managerial opportunistic behavior in the form of earnings management which is measured by 
absolute value of discretionary accruals. Consistent with Teshima and Shuto (2008), the study 
initially finds non-linear (cubic) relationship between the managerial ownership and the absolute 
value of discretionary accruals. According to alignment-entrenchment-alignment hypothesis, the 
relationship between them is significantly negative in low and high levels and significantly 
positive for intermediate level of managerial ownership. However, when the same phenomenon 
is tested with two additional methods, namely, polynomial regression with men-centering 
adjustment and piece-wise linear regression, the results provide strong evidence for a significant 
non-linear link between managerial ownership and earnings management. However, the nature 
of non-linearity is quadratic (‘U’-shaped). Consistent with alignment-entrenchment hypothesis, it 
decreases first as managerial ownership raises up to the level around 11 percent, and any further 
increment in such ownership allows managers greater discretion which increases earnings 
management.  
The findings surely cast doubt on the empirical validity of theoretical model proposed by the 
Teshima and Shuto (2008) to investigate the relationship between managerial ownership and 
earnings management. Moreover, such conflicting evidence has a potential research implication. 
The findings will surely assist the future researchers to be cautious in drawing conclusion about 
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the relationship between ownership structure and earnings management using polynomial models. 
Particularly, this study highlights the importance of applying alternative model specifications to 
test a nonlinearity rather than solely relying conventional polynomial models.   
 
End Notes 
                                                          
1 Knowing little about the functional forms, the commonly employed linear specifications imply, 
if counterfactual, missing higher order terms in the equation that has been estimated (Borsch-
Supan and Koke, 2002, pp.311-312).  They also argue that if quadratic or higher order terms are 
left out, it creates a left-out variable bias and causes the coefficient of linear ownership variable 
to be underestimated. 
2 The turning points are found by differentiating |DAC| (say, y)  with respect to DIR (say, x), 
assuming all other variables are constant, letting = 0, and solving for x. To determine whether 
x is a maximum or minimum turning point, the value of δ y/δx  is calculated. If δ y/δx >0, 
then the turning point is a minima, and if δ y/δx <0, then the turning point is a maxima. 
3  In earlier paper, Teshima  and Shuto (2008) find the similar conclusion for the ranges 0-13.6 
percent, 13,6-38.8 percent , and above 38.8 percent based on the study of listed Japanese 
companies in the 1990s.  
4 McConnel and Servaes (1990) and Chen et al. (1993) mention that this ownership pattern can 
create difficulties in specifying accurate non-linear models with multiple inflection points 
because few high managerial ownership observations can pull the regression line 
disproportionally towards  them.  
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5  Spline regression or piece-wise linear regression models have substantially greater flexibility 
than polynomial regression models in low dimensions and are generally less likely to generate 
perfect multi-collinearity in higher dimensions ( Marsh and Cormier, 2002, p. 3). 
6 The piece-wise linear regression is used to re-estimate and verify the turning points of the non-
linear equation models as theory provides little specific information in the Japanese context 





Asteriou, D., & Hall, S. G. (2007). Applied Econometrics. Newyork: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Basu, S. L., Hwang, S., Mitsudome, T., & Weintrop, J. (2007). Corporate governance, top 
executive compensation, and firm performance in Japan. Pacific Basin Finance Journal, 
15(1), 56–79. 
Berle, A.A., & Means, G. C. (1932). The Modern corporation and private property. New 
York: MacMillan. 
 
Borsch-Supan, A., & Koke, J. (2002). An applied econometricians’ view of empirical 
corporate governance studies. German Economic Review, 3(3), 295-326. 
Bos, S., Pendleton, A., & Toms, S. (2013). Earnings management in the UK: Managerial 
shareownership, minority shareholder protection and discretionary accruals. SSRN 
Working Paper No. 1747919. Retrieved 15 January 2014, from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1747919 
Bradley, R. A., & Srivastava, S. S. (1979). Correlation in polynomial regression. The 
American Statistician, 33(1), 11-14. 
Chen, H., Hexter, J.L. & Hu, M.Y. (1993) Management ownership and corporate value, 
Managerial and Decision Economics, 14(4), 335-56. 
 
Cheng, Q., & Warfield, T. D. (2005). Equity incentives and earnings management. The 
Accounting Review, 80(2), 441-476. 
Christie, A., & Zimmerman, J. (1994). Efficient and opportunistic choices of accounting 
procedures: Corporate control contents. The Accounting Review, 69(4), 539-566. 
Chung, R., Firth, M., & Kim, J-B. (2002). Institutional monitoring and opportunistic 
earnings management. Journal of Corporate Finance, 8(1), 29-48. 
 
Cohen, D. A., Dey, A., & Lys, T. Z. (2008). ) Real and accrual‐based earnings management 
in the Pre‐ and Post‐Sarbanes‐Oxley periods. The Accounting Review, 83(3), 757-787. 
Dalal, D. K., & Zickar, M.J. (2012). Some common myths about centering predictor 
variables in moderated multiple regression and polynomial regression. Organizational 
Research Methods, 15(3), 339-362. 
 
Darrough, M. N., Pourjalali, H., & Saudagaran, S. (1998). Earnings management in 
Japanese companies. The International Journal of Accounting, 33(3), 313-334.  
25 
 
Davies, J.R., Hillier, D., & McColgan, P. (2005). Ownership structure, managerial behavior 
and corporate value. Journal of Corporate Finance, 11(4), 645–660. 
 
Dechow, P.M. (1994). Accounting earnings and cash flows as measures of firm 
performance: The role of accounting accruals.  Journal of Accounting and Economics 18 
(1), 3–42. 
 
Dechow, P. M., & Skinner, D. J. (2000). Earnings management: Reconciling the views of 
accounting academics, practitioners, and regulators. Accounting Horizons, 14(2), 235-250. 
 
Dechow, P.M., Sloan, R.G. and Sweeney, A.P. (1995) Detecting earnings management, 
The Accounting Review, 70(2), 193-225. 
 
Demsetz, H., & Lehn, K. (1985). The Structure of corporate Ownership: Causes and 
consequences. Journal of Political Economy, 93(6), 1155-1177. 
Francis, J. R., Maydew, E.L., & Sparks, H. C. (1999). The role of Big6 auditors in the 
credible reporting of accruals. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 18(2), 17-34. 
Gabrielsen, G., Gramlich, J.D., & Plenborg, T. (2002). Managerial ownership, information 
content of earnings, and discretionary accruals in a non-U.S. setting, Journal of Business 
Finance and Accounting, 29(7-8), 967-987. 
 
Hair, J.F. Jr. , Anderson, R.E., Tatham, R.L., & Black, W.C. (1998). Multivariate Data 
Analysis, (5th Edition). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Healy, P. M. (1985). The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 7(1-3), 85-107. 
Healy, P. M., & Walen, J. M. (1999). A review of the earnings management literature and 
its implications for standard settings. Accounting Horizons, 13(4), 365-383. 
Hill, R. C., Griffiths, W. E., & Lim, G. C. (2012). Principles of econometrics (fourth 
edition). NJ: John Wiley & sons, Inc. 
Jensen, M., & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and 
capital structure. Journal Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–360. 
 
Jones, J. J. (1991). Earnings management during import relief investigations. Journal of 
Accounting Research, 29(2), 193-228. 
Kasznik, R. (1999). On the association between voluntary disclosure and earnings 
management. Journal of Accounting Research, 37(1), 57-81. 
26 
 
Khan, A.  &  Mather, P.  (2013). The value of executive director share ownership and 
discretionary accruals.  Accounting Research Journal, 26 (1), 35–55. 
Kothari, S. P., Leone, A. J., & Wasley, C. E. (2005). Performance matched discretionary 
accrual measures. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 39(1), 163–197. 
Leuz, C., Nanda, D., & Wysocki, P. D. (2003). Earnings management and investor 
protection: an international comparison. Journal of Financial Economics, 69(3), 505-527. 
 
Marsh, L. C., & Cormier, D. R. (2002). Spline regression models. London: Sage 
Publications, Inc. 
McConnell, J. J., & Servaes, H. (1990). Additional evidence on equity ownership and 
corporate value. Journal of  Financial Economics, 27(2), 595–612. 
 
Mitchell, M. N. (2012). Interpreting and visualizing regression models using Stata. Texas: 
StataCorp LP. 
Mitra, S., & Cready, W. M. (2005). Institutional stock ownership, accrual management, and 
information environment. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 20 (3), 257-286 
Mitra, S., & Rodrigue, J. (2002). A methodological issue in earnings management research. 
Journal of Forensic Accounting, 3(2), 185-206. 
Morck, R., Shleifer. A., & Vishny, R.W. (1988). Management ownership and market 
valuation: an empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 20(1), 293–315. 
 
Othman, H.B. and Zeghal, D. (2006). A study of earnings-management motives in the 
Anglo-American and Euro-Continental accounting models: The Canadian and French cases, 
The International Journal of Accounting, 41(4), 406-435. 
 
Rajgopal, S., Venkatachalam, M. and Jiambalvo, J. (1999) Is institutional ownership 
associated with earnings management and the extent to which stock prices reflect future 
earnings? SSRN Working Paper No. 163433. Retrieved 28 December 2014, from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.163433 
Ruppert, D. (2011).  Statistics and data analysis for Financial Engineering. NY: Springer 
Science Business Media, LLC. 
Sakawa, H. & Watanabel, N. (2008). Relationship between managerial compensation and 




Sánchez-Ballesta, J.D., & García-Meca, E. (2007). Ownership structure, discretionary 
accruals and the informativeness of earnings. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 15(4), 677-691. 
 
Scherer, F. (1988). Corporate ownership and control. In J. R. Meyer and J.M. Gustafson 
(eds.), The US Business Corporation, (pp. 43-66). Cambridge: Ballinger. 
Scott, W. R. (2012). Financial Accounting Theory. Toronto: Pearson Prentice Hall. 
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A Survey of Corporate Governance. The Journal of 
Finance, 52(2), 737-783. 
Short, H., & Keasey, K. (1999) Managerial ownership and the performance of firms: 
evidence from the UK. Journal of Corporate Finance, 5(1), 79–101. 
 
Shuto, A. (2007). Executive compensation and earnings management: Empirical evidence 
from Japan. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 16(1), 1–26. 
Teshima, N., & Shuto, A. (2008). Managerial ownership and earnings management: Theory 
and empirical evidence from Japan. Journal of International Financial Management and 
Accounting, 19(2), 107-132. 
 
Velury, U., & Jenkins, D.S. (2006) Institutional ownership and quality of earnings. Journal 
of Business Research, 59(9), 1043-1051. 
 
Vogelvang, B. (2005). Econometrics theory and applications with EViews. London: 
Pearson Eduction Ltd.  
 
Warfield, T. D., Wild, J. J., & Wild, K. L. (1995). Managerial ownership, accounting 
choics and informativeness of earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 20(1), 61-
91. 
Wongrin, W., Rodchuen, M., & Bookkamana, P. (2013). Application of independent 
variables transformations for polynomial regression model estimations. 3rd International 
Conference on Applied Mathematics and Pharmaceutical Sciences (ICAMPS) April 29-30, 
2013 Singapore. 
Yang, C-Y., & Lai H-N., &  Tan, B. L. (2008). Managerial ownership structure and 
earnings management.  Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting, 6(1), 35 – 53.  
Yeo, G.H.H., Tan, P.M.S., Ho, K.W., & Chen, S.-S. (2002) Corporate ownership structure 





Young, S. (1999). Systematic measurement error in the estimation of discretionary 
accruals: an evaluation of alternative modeling procedures. Journal of Business Finance 





































p1 p20 Fraction of shares owned 







Figure 1. Non-monotonic   Relationship Between Earnings Management and 
Director (managerial) share ownership. 






Table 1. Industry-wise Sample Classifications
TSE-industry name observation Percent
Cumulative 
Freq.
Chemicals 1,062 9.35 9.35
Construction 769 6.77 16.12
Electric Appliances 1,143 10.06 26.18
Electric Power & Gas 200 1.76 27.94
Foods 539 4.74 32.68
Glass & Ceramics Products 292 2.57 35.26
Information & Communication 365 3.21 38.47
Iron & Steel 349 3.07 41.54
Land Transportation 419 3.69 45.23
Machinery 1,081 9.52 54.74
Marine Transportation 117 1.03 55.77
Metal Products 290 2.55 58.33
Nonferrous Metals 265 2.33 60.66
Other Products 445 3.92 64.58
Pharmaceutical 208 1.83 66.41
Precision Instruments 228 2.01 68.42
Pulp & Paper 107 0.94 69.36
Real Estate 241 2.12 71.48
Retail Trade 506 4.45 75.93
Rubber Products 133 1.17 77.1
Services 452 3.98 81.08
Textile & Apparels 273 2.4 83.49
Transport Equipment 616 5.42 88.91
Warehousing and Harbor transport. 222 1.95 90.86
Wholesale Trade 1,038 9.14 100
Total 11,360 100






Variable |DAC| DIR FIN CORP COMP DER SIZE
|DAC| 1
DIR 0.0502* 1
FIN -0.1090* -0.3155* 1
CORP 0.0401* -0.1514* -0.5342* 1
COMP 0.0392* 0.3338* -0.3652* 0.0886* 1
DER 0.0296* -0.1272* -0.0172 0.0950* -0.1698* 1
SIZE -0.0605* -0.2708* 0.4737* -0.1823* -0.5445* 0.2287* 1
Table 3. Correlation Matrix
Source: Author’s research.                                                                                                                                            
Note:  * indicates statistically significant at  5%.  
Variable Observation Mean Median SD
|DAC| 11,360 0.028 0.02 0.025
DIR 11,360 0.039 0.01 0.075
FIN 11,360 0.269 0.26 0.135
CORP 11,360 0.258 0.22 0.169
COMP 11,360 0.003 0.00 0.004
DER 11,360 0.569 0.57 0.187
SIZE 11,360 10.987 10.86 1.427
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
Source: Author's research.                                                                                                                                    
Notes: Variable descriptions                                                                                                                            
DAC|=absolute value of discretionary accruals using the modified CFO Jones model 
(Kasznik, 1999); DIR=fraction of the shares owned by directors; FIN= fraction of the shares 
owned by financial institutions; CORP =fraction of the shares owned by other 
corporations; COMP= total cash compensation paid to all directors divided by total assets; 
DER =total debt divided by total assets; SIZE = natural logarithm of sales.
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Independent var iableCoeff. t-statistic coeff. t-statistic coeff. t-statist ic
C 0.044*** 13.09 0.047*** 13.53 0.048*** 13.61
DIR -0.004 -0.79 -0.038*** -3.66 -0.079*** -4.15
DIR
2




FIN -0.013*** -4.42 -0.014*** -4.77 -0.014*** -4.87
CORP -0.002 -1.02 -0.003 -1.37 -0.003 -1.54
COMP -0.09 -1.14 -0.083 -1.05 -0.082 1.04
DER 0.003** 1.97 0.002 1.61 0.002 1.52
SIZE -0.001*** -3.39 -0.001*** -3.74 -0.001*** -3.94
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes




F-Statistic 28.76 28.27 27.77
N 11,360 11,360 11,360
Turning point(s) 17.10% 11.60%
37.20%
Table 4. Regression Results of Discretionary Accruals on Ownership Variables
Dependent variable= |DAC|
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Source: Author’s research.
Notes: (1)  Variable descriptions
                    DIR2 = square of the fraction of the shares owned by directors,
                    DIR3=cube of the fraction of the shares owned by directors.
            (2) Indicator variables for the TSE industry classification code and for the years, from 2001 to 2011, are included but not  reported. 
            (3) t-statistics are based on heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors and covariance.




Table 5(A).  Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for Collinearity Check
VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF
DIR 1.39 0.7194 8.38 0.1193 31.8 0.0314
DIR
2




FIN 2.13 0.4695 2.15 0.4651 2.16 0.4633
CORP 1.67 0.5988 1.68 0.5952 1.69 0.5916
COMP 1.52 0.6579 1.52 0.6579 1.52 0.6558
DER 1.10 0.9091 1.11 0.9009 1.11 0.9022
SIZE 1.70 0.5882 1.71 0.5848 1.72 0.5799
Mean VIF 1.59 3.43 34.04
Source: Author’s research.
Table 5(B).   Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for Collinearity Check
VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF
DIRC 1.29 0.7752 2.75 0.3636 2.86 0.3497
DIRC
2




FIN 2.04 0.4902 2.05 0.4878 2.07 0.4831
CORP 1.65 0.6061 1.65 0.6061 1.65 0.6061
COMP 1.50 0.6667 1.51 0.6623 1.51 0.6623
DER 1.09 0.9174 1.09 0.9174 1.10 0.9091
SIZE 1.70 0.5882 1.71 0.5848 1.71 0.5848
Mean VIF 1.55 1.89 3.95
Source: Author’s research.
Table 5(C).  Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for Collinearity Check
VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF
DIR0_p1  1.43 0.6993 1.99 0.5014 2.05 0.4878
DIRp1_p2  1.70 0.5895 2.18 0.4592
DIRp2_over 1.34 0.7439
FIN 2.13 0.4694 2.16 0.4638 2.16 0.4634
CORP 1.66 0.6019 1.68 0.5936 1.69 0.5929
COMP 1.52 0.6595 1.52 0.6561 1.52 0.6561
DER 1.10 0.9091 1.11 0.9040 1.11 0.9036
SIZE 1.70 0.5871 1.71 0.5842 1.71 0.5842
Mean VIF 1.59 1.70 1.72
Source: Author’s research.
Variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3





Table 6.  No. of Firm-year Observations by Turning Points of Director Ownership 
percentage range No. of observations Percent (%)
<11.6% 10020 88.20








Independent variableCoeff. t-statistic coeff. t-statistic coeff. t-statistic
C 0.045*** 13.25 0.045*** 13.46 0.045*** 13.44
DIRC -0.005 -1.13 -0.021*** -2.94 -0.021*** -2.94
DIRC
2




FIN -0.013*** -4.54 -0.013*** -4.68 -0.013*** -4.67
CORP -0.002 -1.15 -0.003 -1.38 -0.003 -1.39
COMP -0.086 -1.09 -0.078 -0.99 -0.079 -0.99
DER 0.003* 1.94 0.003* 1.83 0.003* 1.85
SIZE -0.001*** -3.4 -0.001*** -3.62 -0.001*** -3.61
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes




F-Statistic 28.78 28.28 27.72
N 11,360 11,360 11,360
Turning point(s) 11.70%
Source: Author’s research.
Notes: (1)  Variables descriptions
                   DIRC= fraction of the shares owned by directors(mean-centered),
                   DIRC2 = square of the fraction of the shares owned by directors(mean-centered),
                   DIRC3=cube of the fraction of the shares owned by directors(mean-centered).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
            (2) Indicator variables for the TSE industry classification and for the years, from 2001 to 2011, are included but not reported.
            (3) t-statistics are based on heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors and covariance.
            (4) *** , **,  and * indicate  statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Table 7. Regression (mean-centering adjustment) Results of Discretionary Accruals on Ownership Variables
Dependent variable= |DAC|






Independent variableCoeff. t-statistic coeff. t-statistic coeff. t-statistic
C 0.047*** 13.53 0.047*** 13.63 0.047*** 13.63
DIR0_P1 -0.026*** -3.24 -0.04*** -4.39 -0.040*** -4.35
DIRp1_p2 0.025*** 2.88 0.025*** 2.63
DIRp2_over 0.002 0.03
FIN -0.015*** -5.26 -0.014*** -4.87 -0.014*** -4.87
CORP -0.004* -1.91 -0.003 -1.50 -0.003 -1.50
COMP -0.069 -0.88 -0.086 -1.09 -0.086 -1.09
DER 0.003 1.65 0.002 1.58 0.002 1.58
SIZE -0.001*** -3.61 -0.001*** -3.80 -0.001*** -3.80
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes




F-Statistic 28.89 28.35 27.7
N 11,360 11,360 11,360
Turning point(s) 11.6% (p1)
37.2% (p2)
Source: Author’s research.
Notes: (1)  Variables descriptions
                  DIR0_p1 = DIR (fraction of shares owned by directors) if DIR < p1, =p1 if DIR >= p1,
                   DIRp1_p2 = 0 if DIR < p1, = (DIR-p1) if DIR >= p1 and <p2, = (p2-p1) if DIR>=p2,
                   DIRp2_over=0 if DIR<p2, = (DIR-p2) if DIR>=p2. 
           (2) Indicator variables for the TSE industry classification and for the years, from 2001 to 2011, are included but not reported. 
           (3) t-statistics are based on heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors and covariance.
           (4) *** , **,  and * indicate  statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Table 8. Regression (piece-wise) Results of Discretionary Accruals on Ownership Variables
Dependent variable= |DAC|
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
 
